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ABSTRACT
On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed an executive
order with the supposed purpose of enhancing public safety of the interior
of the United States. Part of the Administration’s plan includes
threatening “sanctuary jurisdictions,” also known as “sanctuary cities,”
with the loss of federal funds for failing to comply with federal law,
specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
There are several problems with this plan: (1) there is no solid
definition for what makes a city a “sanctuary;” (2) if we accept the
Administration’s allusion that a sanctuary jurisdiction is one that
“willfully” refuses to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, practically no city
constitutes a sanctuary jurisdiction; (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1373, absent specific
spending clause obligations, threatens to run afoul of federalism
principles as laid out in the Supreme Court case Printz v. United States;
(4) the order vests discretionary authority in the Secretary of Homeland
Security (Secretary) to designate a jurisdiction as a sanctuary; and (5) the
stripping of federal funds from “sanctuary jurisdictions” flirts with the
prohibition against federal government coercion via threats of defunding
as described in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.
The Administration’s current plan, represented in Executive Order No.
13768, is a vague, unsophisticated, and an unconstitutional attempt to
require states and local law enforcement to assist the federal government
with enforcing immigration law. Examining the background of federal
power with regards to immigration, the author will examine the
Administration’s Executive Order in the context of limitations on federal
power, as well as determine ways the federal government can receive
local law enforcement’s aid without violating any constitutional
principles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Part II of this article considers the origination of the federal
government’s, and in particular the Executive Branch’s, power to enforce
immigration laws. This section discusses the roles of the different
branches of the federal government concerning immigration; the role
federalism plays in placing practical limits on those branches in the area
of immigration; and walk through an example of a Federal and Local
Government immigration enforcement action. Part III focuses on
Executive Order 13768 (E.O. 13768): sanctuary jurisdictions, or cities as
they will be referred to synonymously throughout the manuscript.1 This
section analyzes three main issues: (1) the absent definition of “sanctuary
city;” (2) whether the definition of “sanctuary jurisdiction” E.O. 13768
appears to purport should be interpreted as a legal and enforceable
definition, and, if so, what types of municipal action results in a city being
labeled a sanctuary jurisdiction; and (3) the limited number of
jurisdictions E.O. 13768’s “sanctuary jurisdiction” definition would
actually apply to due to local government creativity.
Part IV focuses on the underlying statute on which E.O. 13768 relies
in regards to determining which jurisdictions should be labeled
sanctuaries, 8 U.S.C. § 1373,2 and also addresses whether 8 U.S.C. §
1373 can be reconciled with Printz v. United States.3 Further, this section
briefly describes the Spending Clause4 as well as the Office of Justice
Program’s (OJP) guidance for compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Part V
addresses the consequences of applying E.O. 13768 to sanctuary
jurisdictions. This section discusses: (1) the Secretary having seemingly
sole authority and discretion to designate a city a sanctuary jurisdiction;
and (2) the issue that is illustrated through the case of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.5 Part VI asserts that the
Trump Administration’s goal in enacting E.O. 13768, the punishment of
localities that adopt laws and policies that make it more difficult for
federal immigration enforcement to carry out their duties, is entirely
realizable if the Administration simply takes a different approach.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 1.
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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This Article argues the arbitrary nature of the government action and
discretionary nature of the sanctuary jurisdiction designation, both
contained in the executive order, could be removed by creating a formal
review process through the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of the
Inspector General’s (OIG) Office, similar to the former compliance
guidance process regarding 8 U.S.C. § 1373 under the Office of Justice
Program. Lastly, the Article addresses the question of whether E.O.
13768 is constitutional.
II. IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the
subject of immigration and the status of aliens. . . . This authority rests, in
part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to “establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization,” and its inherent power as sovereign to
control and conduct relations with foreign nations . . . .6

Immigration is one of the few areas Congress has plenary power over7
because immigration is a question of national sovereignty relating to a
nation’s right to define its borders.8 As such, courts traditionally give
immigration matters a wide berth, as demonstrated by the “border search
exception” to the Fourth Amendment, which allows for searches and
seizures at the United States border without the typical probable cause
determination or warrant requirement.9 Given its broad powers in the
realm of foreign affairs, diplomacy, and security, the Executive Branch

6. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–97 (2012) (citations omitted).
7. See Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration Policy?, CTR.
FOR IMMIGRATION STUD. (Feb. 25, 2009), http://cis.org/plenarypower [https://perma.cc/BAH6H6EF] (“The ability of Congress and the executive branch to regulate immigration is what has
come to be known as the political branches’ “plenary power” over immigration.”).
8. See Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (“It is an accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases an upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”) (quoting Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)); see also Feere, supra note 7 (arguing that the
government’s power to exclude noncitizens is un-debatable and incident to every independent
nation).
9. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (asserting warrantless border
searches are reasonable under the Constitution as part of the “longstanding right of the sovereign
to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country . . . .”).
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is often granted wide latitude when enforcing immigration laws.10
However, this plenary power, ironically, is not absolute.11
In Zadvydas v. Davis,12 the Supreme Court held that the plenary power
doctrine is subject to constitutional limitations and does not justify
indefinite detention of foreign-born nationals.13 The Court reasoned that
constitutional protections through the Due Process Clause apply to all
persons within the United States, regardless of immigration status.14
Zadvydas established that there are important constitutional limitations to
executive and legislative action in the field of immigration and was
referenced recently in the Ninth Circuit case of Washington v. Trump,15
which challenged an executive order similar to the one discussed in this
article.16
While Congress and the Executive Branch may have power over
immigration,17 the federal government relies on state and local
cooperation to carry out and enforce the nation’s immigration laws. This
is a matter of practicality, as state and local law enforcement officers far
outnumber federal immigration enforcement personnel.18 While the
federal government may promulgate immigration laws and policies in the
United States, both Congress and the Executive Branch are still bound by

10. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1950)
(explaining that the admission or exclusion of foreign-born nationals does not solely stem from the
legislative power but is also inherent in the executive power to control foreign affairs, and thus the
decision to admit or exclude foreign-born nationals could be placed with the President, who may
then delegate that authority to an executive officer).
11. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (imposing limitations upon the
Attorney General’s ability to indefinitely detain unauthorized immigrants).
12. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
13. Id. at 695.
14. Id. at 693.
15. 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017).
16. Id. at 1156. The executive order banned for ninety days the entry of certain individuals
from seven different countries. Id.
17. Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012) (“The Government of the United States
has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”).
18. Compare BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLW2-RPY5] (reporting that state and local law enforcement
employed approximately 1,133,000 persons in 2008), with BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 2 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN9B-C2BZ] (reporting only 55,000 officers
employed by DHS).
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the federalism principles delineated in the Tenth Amendment.19 The
seminal case demonstrating the limits of commanding state and local
cooperation is Printz v. United States.20
In Printz, the Supreme Court determined whether certain provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Constitution of
the United States.21 The Supreme Court held that the provisions
requiring state and local law enforcement to perform duties pursuant to
the execution of the Act, such as background checks, violated the Tenth
Amendment.22 In reaching this conclusion the Court analyzed the
“historical understanding and practice, the structure of the Constitution,
and in the jurisprudence of [the] Court.”23 The historic understanding of
the Constitution revealed that the federal government usually abstained
from exercising control over state officials for the vast majority of the
nation’s history.24 The structure of the Constitution demonstrated it was
built on principles of federalism or dual sovereignty, which cannot be
realized if the federal government could commandeer and order state
officials to act against their will.25 Allowing Congress to “draft” state
law enforcement into enforcing federal law would violate Separation of
Powers, as the President would be robbed of his ability to appoint or
remove administrators to execute the laws.26 Nor is Congress permitted
to enlist the power of the states to circumvent the power of the Executive.27

19. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
20. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
21. Id. at 902 (citing Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)); see H.R. REP. NO. 103-344, at 7–10 (1993)
(explaining that the bill establishes a “national, five-day waiting period for the purchase of a
handgun” and local law enforcement are to use the waiting period to determine whether the
purchaser has any felony convictions or is prohibited from purchasing a handgun).
22. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 933.
23. Id. at 905.
24. Id. at 905–18 (rebutting each of the government’s assertions that the historical
understanding and practice of the Constitution was to require states to perform federal duties).
25. Id. at 918–22.
26. Id. at 922–23
27. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (holding that the Tenth
Amendment is violated when Congress directs states to regulate in a particular way, as the
Constitution does not authorize Congress to commandeer the state legislative process by
compelling states to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program).
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Lastly, prior case law, such as New York v. United States,28 established
that even when acting within its constitutional authority to enable or
prohibit certain acts, Congress could not force state legislatures to pass
laws enabling or prohibiting those same acts.29
Because Printz determined the federal government cannot
commandeer state and local forces into administering laws passed by
Congress,30 we must return back to the idea of cooperation and voluntary
compliance.31 The following is an example of normal federal-local
government interaction during immigration enforcement:
A city police officer pulls someone over and arrests him or her for
something unrelated to citizenship (such as drunken driving or disorderly
conduct). Whether or not the city has a sanctuary policy. . .
. . . he or she is booked into the local county jail, which is usually run by
the county sheriff’s department.
At the jail, his or her fingerprints are taken and sent to the FBI, which sends
the inmates’ information to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. U.S.
law requires this information sharing between local and federal law
enforcement agencies.
If ICE finds that the inmate is undocumented, it submits a detainer request
to the county jail. ICE typically asks jails to hold inmates an extra 48 hours
after they would otherwise be released so they can get a warrant to begin
deportation proceedings.
The Department of Homeland Security has said that complying with these
requests is voluntary because keeping someone in jail without a warrant
violates the 4th Amendment. So, what happens next depends on county
policy.

28. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
29. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program . . . . Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s
officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program”) (citing New York v. United
States at 186–87). The Court described such a violation of state sovereignty as “‘merely [an] ac[t]
of usurpation.’” Id. at 924 (quoting The Federalist No. 33 at 204).
30. Id. at 933 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 188).
31. Id at 916–18 (describing historical accounts of Presidents soliciting or requesting state
executives support of compliance with federal mandates relating to a number of federal matters).
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If the county says “No.” If the jail is in a county with a policy of frequently
declining these requests, the inmate is released once the criminal case is
complete–if he or she is convicted but doesn’t face additional jail time, if
charges are dropped or if bail is met.
If the county says “Yes.” If the county typically complies with ICE
requests, the inmate would stay in jail while ICE works to obtain an
administrative deportation warrant.
If ICE obtains the warrant, they could pick up the inmate and transfer him
to a federal prison.
Eventually, the inmate could be deported.32

If the undocumented immigrant is released, it will then be up to ICE to
find the individual themselves, often resulting in expending more manhours and resources.33 In either scenario, once an individual is in ICE
custody, he or she will be processed and deported, absent any form of
immigration relief the immigrant may be able to claim.34
III. SANCTUARY CITIES
A. Defining a “Sanctuary City”
With the media, the Trump Administration, and this very manuscript
focusing on sanctuary cities, it might be helpful to have a definition of
32. Darla Cameron, How Sanctuary Cities Work, and How Trump’s
POST
(Jan.
18,
2017),
Executive
Order
Might
Affect
Them,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/sanctuary-cities/
[https://perma.cc/KKF9FN29]; see LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., SEARCHING FOR
SANCTUARY (2016), https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map [https://perma.cc/3HZP-8EXY]
(providing statistics on the counties that honor or do not honor detainer requests).
33. See BEN GITIS & LAURA COLLINS, AM. ACTION FORUM, THE BUDGETARY AND
ECONOMIC COSTS OF ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
(2015),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-budgetary-and-economic-costs-ofaddressing-unauthorized-immigration-alt/ [https://perma.cc/SSJ2-D8Q3] (reporting that the costs
of investigating and detaining individuals suspected of being removable would be more costly
without the help of state and local law enforcement). According to the report, if ICE were to use its
own investigators to detain 8.96 million individuals without the help of state and local law
enforcement, it would need $243.3 billion, while a total of $43.5 billion would be needed if state
and local law enforcement cooperated. Id.
34. See Possible Defenses to Deportation of An Undocumented Alien, NOLO.COM,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/possible-defenses-deportation-undocumented-alien.
html [https://perma.cc/7RZ5-ESJ9] (discussing the different forms of relief in removal
proceedings).
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what exactly a “sanctuary city” is. The problem is that there is no set
definition, legally or colloquially, for the term.35
The problem with the Executive Order that authorizes funding to be
stripped from sanctuary cities is that the Order does not define the term.36
If there is no set definition of what constitutes a “sanctuary city,” then the
administrator is left only two options: arbitrary enforcement of the order,
or no enforcement at all.37 This is not to say that it would be impossible
to create a definition, or that there are no common characteristics that
typify “sanctuary cities.”38 Such characteristics may include: not
discriminating between undocumented and documented immigrants for
taxpayer funded services;39 a tendency of not honoring ICE detainer
requests;40 or prohibiting law enforcement and other employees from
inquiring about an individual’s immigration status while providing
35. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (failing to provide
a definition of a “sanctuary jurisdiction,” other than one that “willfully” refuses to comply with 8
U.S.C. § 1373 (2012)); see also Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a Sanctuary, 61 SMU L. REV. 133,
135 (exploring the changing understanding and characterization of the term “sanctuary cities” and
its outward perception as interchangeably beneficial or tainted); Alan Gomez, A MultimillionDollar Question: What’s a Sanctuary City’?, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2017, 6:14 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/26/multi-million-dollar-question-whatssanctuary-city/100947440/ [https://perma.cc/DK3K-G6UY] (explaining there is no legal definition
of “sanctuary city” and that the DOJ refused to comment when asked to define a “sanctuary city”).
36. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg.
37. See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(explaining that E.O. 13768 fails to articulate clear standards for the Secretary, which can lead to
“arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” of the order). Specifically, the preliminary injunction
opinion stated that the order failed to designate a clear definition of what a “sanctuary jurisdiction”
is, thus providing the Secretary with unfettered discretion in its enforcement. Id; see also City of
Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173376, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19,
2017) (stating that E.O. 13768 “does not define ‘sanctuary jurisdiction’ and does not expand upon
what constitutes ‘willfully refus[ing]to comply’ with Section 1373.”).
38. See Inez Friedman-Boyce et al., Legal Analysis: Sanctuary Cities: Distinguishing
Rhetoric from Reality, 61 B.B.J. 8, 8 (2017) (explaining a common objective of sanctuary
jurisdictions is to “promote public safety and confidence in local law enforcement.”); see also
Jennifer M. Hansen, Comment, The Unintended Effects of State and Local Enforcement of
Immigration Law, 10 SCHOLAR 289, 298–99 (2008) (highlighting some common characteristics
sanctuary cities employ).
39. Jerry Shaw, 3 Characteristic of Sanctuary Cities’ Policies, NEWSMAX
(Oct. 16, 2015, 1:35 AM), https://www.newsmax.com/fastfeatures/sanctuary-cities-policies/2015/
10/16/id/696495/ [https://perma.cc/X3PS-8XM8].
40. Friedman-Boyce et al., supra note 38, at 8 (2017); Alan Berube, Sanctuary Cities and
Trump’s Executive Order, BROOKINGS (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
unpacked/2017/02/24/sanctuary-cities-and-trumps-executive-order/
[https://perma.cc/S2TDR566].
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benefits and services.41 However, once you make a list of common
characteristics, how many characteristics must be met to warrant the
designation of sanctuary city? Are some characteristics weighed
differently than others? All of these questions regarding the definition of
“sanctuary cities” are relevant to enforcing E.O. 13768.
To further understand the importance of this issue, consider Seattle and
Tacoma, Washington. Seattle is widely considered a sanctuary city by
the media, the Administration, and the city itself.42 Mayor Edward
Murray signed an executive order declaring Seattle a “Welcoming
City,”43 a term often used to describe a “sanctuary city,” and has filed
suit questioning the constitutionality of E.O. 13768 and the Trump
administration’s threat to defund “sanctuary jurisdictions.44 Tacoma
declared itself a “Welcoming City” in 2015.45 However, Tacoma draws
a distinction between “Welcoming” and “Sanctuary,” refusing to go as
far as to say that they are a “sanctuary city.”46
With cities designating themselves as sanctuary cities, and no uniform
definition for the term, one might think the Administration would be
inclined to take a city’s word for whether they are a sanctuary city or not.
However, Seattle and Tacoma share the common characteristics of

41. Hansen, supra note 38, at 299; Candice Ruud, Tacoma Council Forms Immigrant and
Refugee Task Force, Stops Shy of Sanctuary City, News Trib. (Feb. 1, 2017, 3:15 PM),
http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article129986129.html [https://perma.
cc/8BAJ-XDRX] (last updated Feb. 1, 2017, 7:05 PM).
42. City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173376, at *5 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 19, 2017) (“Both Seattle and Portland (‘Plaintiffs’ or ‘Cities’) pride themselves on their
status as welcoming and internationally minded cities.”); Res. 31730, 2017 City Council (Wash.
2017).
43. Res. 31730, 2017 City Council (Wash. 2017); see Exec. Order No. 2016-08
(Nov. 23, 2016), http://murray.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Executive-Order-201608_Welcoming-City.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG3V-UFTQ]; see also City Council Affirms
Seattle as a Welcoming City, KING5.COM (Jan. 31, 2017, 6:33 AM),
http://www.king5.com/article/news/local/seattle/city-council-affirms-seattle-as-a-welcoming-city/
394694059 [https://perma.cc/KK9N-8SVC] (“Seattle is officially a Welcoming City, by order of
Mayor Ed Murray and affirmed by the Seattle City Council Monday.”).
44. Compl. for Declaratory Relief, City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00497 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 29, 2017), ECF No. 1; City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 173376 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017).
45. Ruud, supra note 41.
46. See id. (“But the Tacoma council won’t, at least for now, go so far as sanctuary city
status.”).
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sanctuary cities previously described.47 When Tacoma’s mayor urged
the city council not to pass a resolution declaring Tacoma a “Sanctuary
City,” she said: “[m]y position right now is we don’t have to declare
ourselves a sanctuary city because in essence, it’s not what we say in a
press release, it’s about what we do every single day. . . . In Tacoma, that
money matters, and I do not want to put the city in a position to sacrifice
federal funding[.]”48 Regardless of whether or not a city has policies in
place that E.O. 13768 is targeting, cities are purposely not naming
themselves sanctuary cities in an attempt to skirt the Administration’s
gaze.49 While the form over substance approach may seem ridiculous,
without an established definition for “sanctuary jurisdictions,” a city
arbitrarily labelling itself a sanctuary city is akin to the arbitrary
designation process localities are expecting the federal government to
undertake when enforcing E.O. 13768.50
B. “Sanctuary Jurisdictions” under Executive Order 13768
With the confusion E.O. 13768 has caused, and cities questioning
how their status as a “sanctuary” will be determined (and the subsequent
fate of its federal funding), it is of some comfort that the Order at least
alludes to a definition.51 “In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney

47. See Res. 31730, 2017 City Council (Wash. 2017) (implementing policies, such as
making city services accessible to all, regardless of immigration status; honoring detainer requests
only when they are accompanied by a criminal warrant; and directing city employees not to inquire
into immigration status when people seek city services).
48. Ruud, supra note 41.
49. See, e.g., id. (urging the city council not to declare Tacoma a sanctuary city due to
potential loss of federal funding); Ruben Vives et al., Fresno Mayor Vows His Town Won’t Become
‘Sanctuary City,’ Bucking California Trend, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017, 6:35 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-sanctuary-city-california-20170125-story.html [https:
//perma.cc/2T23-7MEM] (quoting Fresno Mayor Lee Brand, “I’m not going to make Fresno a
sanctuary city because I don’t want to make Fresno ineligible from receiving potentially millions
of dollars in infrastructure and other types of projects . . .”). Threatening to defund states for noncompliance with federal laws is not new. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 542 (2012) (discussing the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that if a state fails to comply
with the new coverage requirements, it may lose federal funding).
50. See Ruud, supra note 41 (“[A] city with the tax base of Tacoma . . . can’t afford to lose
the roughly $85 million in federal funding it gets each year. That’s the risk that run’s with selfidentifying as a sanctuary city . . . . ”).
51. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (failing to provide a
definition of a “sanctuary jurisdiction,” other than one that “willfully” refuses to comply with 8
U.S.C. § 1373 (2012)); see also Villazor, supra note 35 at 135 (exploring the changing
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General and the Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent
with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply
with 8 U.S.C. [§] 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to
receive Federal grants . . . .”52 A plain reading of this Order seems to
imply that the definition of a “sanctuary jurisdiction” the
Administration is going to apply to a city or jurisdiction is one that
“willfully refuses to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”53 Very simply, 8
U.S.C. § 1373 prohibits any federal, state, or local official from
prohibiting or restricting “any government entity or official from
sending to, or receiving from, the [Department of Homeland Security]
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.”54 More specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1373
prohibits the prevention or restriction of any government entity or
official to do the following with regard to immigration information:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving information
from, the [DHS];
(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local
government entity.55

A city that passes a law prohibiting law enforcement or city employees
from contacting DHS regarding an individual’s immigration status would
be deemed a “sanctuary jurisdiction,” using E.O. 13768’s definition,
provided the city did so with knowledge that the law would cut against 8
U.S.C. § 1373 (or willfully refused to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373). Such
a determination would result in the city’s federal grant funding being
cut.56 This process sounds simple enough until one realizes application
understanding and characterization of the term “sanctuary cities” and its outward perception as
interchangeably beneficial or tainted).
52. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg.
53. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012))
54. The statute specifically identifies the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as
the agency whose reception of citizenship may not be encumbered. The INS no longer exists, and
the majority of its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
2003. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2192, 2205 (2002)
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 291). 28 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1373 (b) (2012).
56. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. Recently, the DOJ sent letters to twentynine jurisdictions regarding their non-compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Justice Department Sends
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of E.O. 13768’s definition to municipalities across the United States
would result in practically no jurisdiction being considered a “sanctuary
jurisdiction,” rendering the Order toothless.
C. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and Jurisdictions that “Willfully Refuse to
Comply” with the Provision
Neither Seattle nor Tacoma passed an ordinance or policy prohibiting
city employees or law enforcement officials from sending or receiving
information regarding an individual’s citizenship or immigration status
to DHS.57 However, both cities have policies prohibiting law
enforcement and city employees from inquiring into an individual’s
citizenship and immigration status while applying for or providing
municipal services.58 Since local law enforcement and governmental
employees are required not to inquire into the citizenship and
immigration status of individuals, it is impossible for them to willfully
refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 because they cannot be prevented
from exchanging information with DHS that they do not have. While
E.O. 13768 came after the vast majority of these municipalities
promulgated their policies,59 it seems the cities effectively “outsmarted”
the Administration’s Order.
Even if an expanded definition of “sanctuary jurisdiction” under E.O.
13768 included consideration of the aforementioned characteristics of
Letter to 29 Jurisdictions Regarding Their Compliance With 8 U.S.C. 1373, DEP’T OF JUST
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sends-letters-29-jurisdictionsregarding-their-compliance-8-usc-1373 [https://perma.cc/T44F-AKMV]. The DOJ reminded the
jurisdictions of the potential for defunding and allotted certain time for the jurisdictions to
demonstrate their policies comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Id.
57. See Res. 31730, 2017 City Council (Wash. 2017) (implementing policies, such as
making city services accessible to all, regardless of immigration status and directing city employees
not to inquire into immigration status when people seek city services, but no such policy prohibiting
employees from sending or receiving information regarding an individual’s immigration status)
(emphasis added).
58. Id.; see also Seattle Police Manual, tit. 6, § 6.020 (2011), https://www.
seattle.gov/police-manual/title-6 [https://perma.cc/78AS-EPQH] (“[O]fficers will not request
specific documents for the sole purpose of determining someone’s immigration or alien
status . . . .”).
59. The Executive Order was implemented on January 25, 2017. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82
Fed. The mayor of Seattle reaffirmed existing policy regarding the protection of immigrants on
November 23, 2016 and affirmed by the City Council on February 2, 2017. Exec. Order No. 201608 (Nov. 23, 2016); Res. 31730, 2017 City Council (Wash. 2017). Tacoma declared itself a
“Welcoming City” in 2015. Ruud, supra note 41.
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sanctuary cities, enforcing the Order would still cause a host of problems.
Whether a municipality chooses to inquire into immigration status for
benefits and services is irrelevant for purposes of E.O. 13768; offering or
restricting benefits and services is an issue of state and local law. 8
U.S.C. § 1373 concerns the receiving and sharing of information with
DHS rather than local administration of benefits and services.60
Furthermore, an executive order or federal statute should not require a
municipality to honor detainer requests or risk losing federal funding.61
ICE detainer requests ask state and local law enforcement agencies to
hold an immigrant for forty-eight hours.62 This request from federal
authorities to localities may lead to Fourth Amendment violations if the
ICE detainer request is not based on probable cause, the inmate is
released by a judge, or bail was set and posted.63 Not only is E.O. 13768
problematic in terms of its ambiguous definition of “sanctuary cities,”
enforcement of the order contributes to constitutional violations.
IV. 8 U.S.C. § 1373
At first blush, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 seems like a perfectly valid
intergovernmental information-sharing statute. The federal law requires
state and local governments to refrain from prohibiting any government
entity or official from sharing citizenship or immigration information
with DHS.64 However, a federal statute that prohibits state and local

60. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
61. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012)
(“Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with
federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our
system of federalism.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (striking down federal
legislation that commandeers states for federal purposes).
62. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2011) (authorizing any immigration officer to issue a Form I-247
Immigration Detainer–Notice of Action (detainer request) to any other law enforcement agency).
63. See, e.g., Orellana v. Nobles Cnty., 230 F. Supp. 3d 934, 944, 946 (D. Minn. 2017)
(finding that the inmate’s incarceration after he posted bail was solely based on an ICE detainer,
and amounted to a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the detainer was not based on
probable cause); El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 809 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“And the Court
has found that enforcement of mandatory detainer provisions will inevitably lead to Fourth
Amendment violations.”); Santoyo v. United States, No. 5:16-CV-855-OLG, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106253, at *24-25 (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2017) (finding that Santoyo’s detention pursuant an
ICE detainer was not based on probable cause).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
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governments from exercising authority over their own law enforcement
officials is unconstitutional without the Spending Clause.65
A. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and Federalism
The holding of Printz states that an attempt by the federal government
to appropriate state and local officials for a federal purpose violates the
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.66 8 U.S.C. § 1373
does not require any affirmative action on part of state or local officials,
it simply prohibits them from restricting any government official from
exchanging information with DHS.67 Thus, compelling state and local
officials to communicate citizenship and immigration information to the
federal government would be a violation of the Tenth Amendment.68
The Administration may argue that state and local officials in possession
of citizenship and immigration information may voluntarily
communicate that information to DHS, which poses the following
question: while state and local officials may voluntarily share information
with DHS, does the voluntary nature of the action negate the fact that EO
13768 prohibits state and local legislators from exercising authority over
their own law enforcement officers?
State legislatures, county governments, and city councils pass laws that
provide oversight and rules for their employees and officials.69 Section
1373 tells state and local legislatures that they cannot, in effect,
legislate.70 While it has long been recognized that the regulation of
immigration is a federal power, it has also been established that state law
touching on immigration issues without relating to the regulation and

65. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
66. Id. at 933.
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
68. Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
69. See, e.g., Louis Lawrence Boyle, Reforming Civil Service Reform: Should the Federal
Government Continue to Regulate State and Local Government Employees?, 7 J.L. & POL. 243,
244 (1991) (reviewing the regulation of state and local government employee political activity by
state and local laws, constitutions, and charters); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Effect of State Statutes Restricting Political Activities of Public Officers and
Employees, 51 A.L.R. 4th 702, § 2[a] (1987) (providing a comprehensive overview of cases in
which state statutes and local governmental enactments regulate or restrict the political activities
of public officers and employees were upheld where they served governmental interests in
maintaining employee discipline and efficacy).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
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enforcement of federal laws may be valid.71 Thus, while a state or local
law that expressly forbids employees and officials from communicating
immigration and citizenship information to DHS would undoubtedly
make the federal government’s job more difficult, it would not
necessarily be unlawful.72 Ultimately, immigration enforcement is the
federal government’s job.73 The fact that a state or local immigration
law makes the enforcement of federal immigration laws more difficult is
an insufficient justification to ignore the Tenth Amendment.74
B. The Spending Clause
The legal foundation for 8 U.S.C. § 1373 rests on cooperation and
contract through the power of the Spending Clause.75 “The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States . . .”76 The Spending Clause, along with the
Commerce Clause, is one of the federal government’s most powerful
means to pass legislation.77 The language of the Spending Clause has
been interpreted to mean that the federal government can create a national
law, which it might not be able to pass under the authority of the

71. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354, 357–59 (1976) (holding that federal
immigration and naturalization laws did not preempt state laws where regulating conditions for
admissions of foreign nationals were congruent with federal law; such state laws were not held to
be unconstitutional because of consistent state regulatory power).
72. See id. at 357–58 n.5.
73. Id. at 354.
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1 (iterating Congress’ power to levy taxes); STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAX’N, 198TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REVIEW OF THE PRESENT-LAW TAX AND
IMMIGRATION TREATMENT OF RELINQUISHMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND TERMINATION OF LONGTERM RESIDENCY 2–11 (Comm. Print 2003) (recommending the immigration provision, codified
at 8 U.S.C § 1373 (2012), be passed to enable governmental interagency access to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service’s databases for the purposes of enforcing tax rules).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
77. See generally Michael S. Elliott, Comment, The Commerce of Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Can Congress Regulate a “Legitimate Medical Purpose”?, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV 399,
403, 416 (2007) (stating that the two bases of congressional power are the Commerce and Spending
Clauses).
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Commerce Clause, if they attach federal monies to it.78 The reasoning
behind this is that the states may voluntarily accept the federal money,
and thus comply with the new law, or they may decline to act and lose
the funds.79 When brute force through the Commerce Clause does not
work, Congress can always try bribery via the Spending Clause.80 This
concept is perhaps best illustrated in the case of South Dakota v. Dole.81
In South Dakota v. Dole, South Dakota challenged a federal law that
authorized the withholding of 5% of the federal funds given to states for
highway transportation, if they declined to adopt a minimum drinking age
of twenty-one on the basis that the law infringed upon states’ rights.82
The Supreme Court held the statute was a valid exercise of Congress’s
authority under the Spending Clause and established a five-part test to
consider the constitutionality of such acts: (1) The spending must
promote “the general welfare;” (2) The condition must be unambiguous;
(3) The condition should relate “to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs;” (4) The condition imposed on the states
must not, in itself, be unconstitutional; and (5) The condition must not be
coercive.83
Section 1373 was passed with the Spending Clause as Congress’s basis
for the law, and as such, states and localities complying with the statute
are doing so not because of a command from the federal government, but
because they receive money from the federal government.84 8 U.S.C. §
1373 may well pass the five rule test as a valid exercise of Congress’s

78. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (stating legislation
enacted under Congress’ spending powers is similar to a contract; in return for federal funds, the
states agree to comply with federal regulations).
79. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (“Congress has no
authority to order the States to regulate according to its instructions. Congress may offer the States
grants and require the States to comply with accompanying conditions, but the States must have a
genuine choice whether to accept the offer.”).
80. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (claiming Congress has repeatedly
used its Spending Power to further its broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal
funds upon compliance with federal legislation and that the U.S. Supreme Court has continually
upheld this technique against constitutional challenge in order to induce state governments to
cooperate with federal policies).
81. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
82. Id. at 205 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984)).
83. Id. at 207.
84. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”).
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Spending Clause power, but whether or not E.O. 13768 is constitutional
remains to be seen.
C. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 Compliance
Prior to E.O. 13768, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued guidelines to ensure grantees
receiving funding knew the standards by which compliance with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373 would be measured:
If OJP becomes aware of credible evidence of a violation of Section 1373,
the recipient must agree to undertake a review to validate its compliance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. If the recipient determines that it is in compliance
with Section 1373 at the time of review, then it must submit documentation
that contains a validation to that effect and includes an official legal
opinion from counsel (including related legal analysis) adequately
supporting the validation. If the recipient determines that it is not in
compliance with Section 1373 at the time of review, then it must take
sufficient and effective steps to bring it into compliance and submit
documentation that details the steps taken, contains a validation that the
recipient has come into compliance, and includes an official legal opinion
from counsel (including related legal analysis) adequately supporting the
validation. Failure to remedy any violations could result in a referral to the
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, the withholding of
grant funds or ineligibility for future OJP grants or subgrants, or other
administrative, civil, or criminal penalties, as appropriate.85

EO 13768 states that the Secretary retains authority and discretion to
designate a jurisdiction a sanctuary jurisdiction and those jurisdictions
refusing to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, or sanctuary jurisdictions, shall
not be eligible for federal grants at the Secretary and Attorney General’s
discretion.86 Thus, the confusion many localities feel is understandable,
as it appears EO 13768 replaced the existing compliance policy with a
vague and highly unpredictable process for analyzing whether cities may
be stripped of funding.

85. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH 8
U.S.C. § 1373 (2016), https://www.bja.gov/funding/Additional-BJA-Guidance-on-Section-1373October-6-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK7F-S79J] [hereinafter ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE].
86. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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V. DEFUNDING SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS
E.O. 13768’s provisions relating to the stripping of federal funds from
“sanctuary” jurisdictions are unconstitutional.87 The combination of
vague and conflicting standards used to determine a “sanctuary
jurisdiction”; the discretion vested in the Secretary of DHS or Attorney
General to determine whether a jurisdiction is a “sanctuary”; and the
impermissibly coercive nature of E.O. 13768 results in an Order that
cannot stand.88
A. Due Process and Discretion
Under the old OJP guidelines, localities were given a chance to prove
they were in compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or show that they were
rectifying noncompliance prior to their federal funds being withheld.89
In contrast, E.O. 13768 leaves the stripping of federal funds entirely in
the hands of one individual, the Secretary of Homeland Security.90 This
raises a due process concern analyzed in Mathews v. Eldridge.91
In Mathews, Eldridge had his Social Security benefits terminated
without an evidentiary hearing prior to termination, which would have
afforded him an opportunity to argue for the continuation of his
benefits.92 The Supreme Court ultimately held that individuals have a
statutorily granted property right in Social Security benefits implicating

87. See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 533 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(enjoining Executive Order 13768 which threatens a jurisdiction with losing all federal grants
because it violates the Tenth Amendment by coercively compelling that jurisdiction to enforce
federal immigration policies); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (finding
that financial inducement to comply with federal law can be “so coercive as to pass the point at
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’”).
88. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (stating the standardless language of E.O. 13768 creates
potential for arbitrary enforcement).
89. See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 85 (outlining the process by which recipients
can remedy noncompliance); see also Justice Department Provides Last Chance for Cities to Show
1373 Compliance, DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-provides-last-chance-cities-show-1373-compliance
[https://perma.cc/E7SH-X3NJ]
(listing jurisdictions identified by the DOJ’s inspector General as having laws that potentially
violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373, and requiring that they show proof of compliance).
90. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
91. 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976) (deciding whether “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit pay the
recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing”).
92. Id. at 324.
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the Due Process Clause and the following factors have to be weighed
when there is a question of due process of governmental action:
(1) the interests of the individual in retaining their property and the injury
threatened by the official action; (2) the risk of error through the
procedures used and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the costs and administrative burden of the
additional process, and the interests of the government in efficient
adjudication.93

Similar to Social Security benefits, localities use federal grants to
supplement their income and balance their budgets.94 Federal grants are
defined as
. . . legal instrument reflecting the relationship between the United States
Government and a State, a local government, or other entity when 1) the
principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value to the
State or local government or other recipient to carry out a public purpose
of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States instead
of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or services for the
direct benefit or use of the United States Government; and 2) substantial
involvement is not expected between the executive agency and the State,
local government, or other recipient when carrying out the activity
contemplated in the agreement.95

Through the federal grant programs, local governments and states receive
money through a statutorily created property interest in the funds that are
extended to them.96 Considering federal grants under the first of the
Mathews factors, the interest of the jurisdictions in retaining the money
and the injury resulting from such monies being officially withheld would
93. Id. at 321, 332.
94. See Robert S. Catz, Due Process and Federal Grant Termination: Challenging Agency
Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 1067, 1123 (1982) (indicating
federal grant programs are the result of “express congressional decision that public funds should be
advanced . . . in order to achieve a public purpose.”); Iris J. Lav & Michael Leachman, At Risk:
Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: Programs for Low-and Moderate-Income
Families Could Be Bear the Brunt of Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/at-risk-federal-grants-to-state-and-localgovernments [https://perma.cc/2HPL-L7VS] (“Federal funds that go to state and local governments
as grants help finance critical programs and services on which residents of every state rely.”).
95. Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, 31 U.S.C. § 6304 (2012).
96. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 (“[T]he interest . . . in continued receipt of . . . benefits is
a statutorily created “property” interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.”).
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be great.97 Not only do localities come to rely upon the federal funds as
part of their budget, but often federal grants fund transit, social services,
and economic development.98
The procedures outlined in E.O. 13768 do not increase the risk of error,
they assure it.99 Granting the Secretary authority and discretion to
designate a locality a sanctuary jurisdiction is the epitome of arbitrary
government action.100 Even if the Secretary were to be guided by the
definition and standards by which to evaluate the designation of a
“sanctuary jurisdiction,” the Order states that a “sanctuary city” is one
that willfully refuses to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.101 How will
“willfully refus[ing] to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”102 be interpreted if
a jurisdiction that complies with the statute can produce the same result
as a jurisdiction that does not comply?103 Large cities with large
immigrant populations, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New
York City will be left wondering whether their city will be designated as
a “sanctuary jurisdiction,” because of non-compliance with 8 U.S.C. §
1373, or because the Secretary, whose position is at-will, was instructed

97. See id. at 321 (explaining that when there is a question of due process of governmental
action in terminating benefits, the interests of the individual in retaining their property and the
injury threatened by the official action must be weighed).
98. E.g., Allison Sundell, Mayor Asks City Council to Not Declare Tacoma Sanctuary
City, KING5 NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017, 4:44 AM), http://www.king5.com/news/local/tacoma/mayorasks-city-council-to-not-declare-tacoma-a-sanctuary-city/395224991
[https://perma.cc/97CQ5QUK ] (explaining Tacoma’s dependence on federal funds for transportation, welfare services and
other economic development programs).
99. Eli Rosenber, Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Executive Order on Denying Funding to
Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/
wp/2017/11/21/federal-judge-blocks-trumps-executive-order-on-denying-funding-to-sanctuary-cit
ies/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6b79e8331487 [https://perma.cc/23FU-GALW] (quoting law
professor Heidi Li Feldman of Georgetown University, “[L]iterally every way the executive branch
could violate the Constitution with regard to municipalities, this administration has.”).
100. See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1217 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(“The Executive Order also fails to provide clear standards to the Secretary and the Attorney
General to prevent ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 (1972)).
101. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
102. Id.
103. A complying jurisdiction may choose not to ask residents about immigration or
citizenship status and therefore is under no obligation to submit information that it does not have
to DHS. A non-complying jurisdiction may willfully refuse to comply with Section 1373 and
prevent submission of information to DHS. In both instances, DHS has not received any
information.
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to make the designation by the President of the United States because the
city made fun of his proclivity for golfing.
The second Mathews factor considers the adequacy of existing
processes to prevent erroneous deprivation of a particular interest and the
value (or cost) of an alternative procedural option to make a similar
conclusion.104 In the absence of a workable definition, the designation
of a jurisdiction as a sanctuary and subsequently eligible for defunding is
a discretionary decision vested in the Secretary and Attorney General.105
This is a declaration, not a process. This type of process, or lack thereof,
runs afoul of the second Mathews factor and the Administration cannot
vest such discretionary authority in an individual that would lead to
arbitrary discrimination.106 Such discretionary decision-making may be
based on “incorrect or misleading factual premises” or in this case, an
arbitrary interpretation of what “sanctuary jurisdiction” means.107
The last factor of the Mathews test considers “the Government’s
interest, including . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”108
Section 9 of the Executive Order asserts no government interest in
making a jurisdiction ineligible to receive federal grants.109 The value
and import of the state interest at stake (federal funding), at a minimum
would warrant an opportunity to respond to the deprivation of such
interest and outweigh whatever countervailing interest the federal
government might assert.110 The presumptive value to the federal

104. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
105. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
106. See Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959) (“Where administrative action has
raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President
intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process.”); Catz,
supra note 94 at 1089 (“The essence of due process is that legally generated expectations of
continued receipt of government benefits may not be summarily denied by arbitrary administrative
action.”).
107. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
108. 424 U.S. at 335.
109. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799.
110. See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (“The
opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be
taken is a fundamental due process requirement.”). Cf. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)
(finding the state’s interest in public safety warranted the immediate suspension of a driver’s license
following an individual’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test upon arrest for suspected drunk
driving.); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (indicating the procedures relied on to admit children
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government of additional procedural processes to comply with due
process standards is presumably minimal considering the 2016 OJP
guidelines.111 In the past, the federal government developed additional
procedures for other agency determinations, and it is not unreasonable for
the federal government to assume the burden of providing constitutional
due process standards in the determination of “sanctuary jurisdiction.” In
practice, the Administration’s Order will fail the Due Process analysis
under Mathews v. Eldridge.
B. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,112 the
Supreme Court for the first time held that Congress used its power under
the Spending Clause in a way that was impermissibly coercive.113 As
part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Congress
passed a provision requiring states to expand Medicaid coverage in order
to receive federal Medicaid funding, or else lose Medicaid funding
altogether.114 The Court reasoned that Congress had presented the states
with a fait accompli.115 Congress’s threat of withholding Medicaid
funding for non-compliance with ACA would mean the decimation of
state budgets,116 violating the fifth element of Dole’s test as an
impermissible coercive use of the Spending Clause.117

to state mental hospitals were adequate to support the state’s interest of avoiding erroneous
admittance of patients compared to an adversarial hearing requested by a class of patients).
111. See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE supra note 85. The procedures detailed in the guidance
memo require only the submittal of documentation by a grant recipient showing either compliance
with § 1373 or alternatively a legal opinion adequately supporting a claim that a recipient has taken
steps to return to compliant status. Id.
112. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
113. Id. at 581, 585 (comparing a federal law’s threat to reduce federal highway funding by
5% for failure to raise the drinking age to twenty-one as financial encouragement in comparison to
the ACA’s threat of 100% reduction as financially coerciveness).
114. Id. at 585 (“Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the
authority . . . withhold all ‘further [Medicaid] payments . . . to the State’ if she determines that the
State is out of compliance with any Medicaid requirement, including those contained in the
expansion.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c).
115. Id. at 581 (“[T]he financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”)
116. See id. at 581–82 (“Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average
State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”).
117. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
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Similarly, the failure of E.O. 13768 to specify which federal grants
would be withheld from non-compliant jurisdictions leaves the
implication that all federal monies may be withheld, resulting in an
impermissible coercive use of Congress’s spending powers.118 The City
of Tacoma refused to call itself a “sanctuary city,” because they did not
want to jeopardize the $85 million in federal grants they receive almost
every year.119 Federal grants provide 10% of New York City’s $80.5
billion budget.120 The Spending Clause is based on the idea that states
and the federal government are dual sovereigns and as such, freedom of
choice is essential.121 Accept my condition or lose 10% of your budget
is not negotiation; it is robbery.
Lastly, E.O. 13768 also violates the second element of the Dole test
because the condition to receive federal grants must be unambiguous.122
Localities still do not fully understand the meaning of “willfully refuses
to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.” This could mean that the Secretary or
Attorney General arbitrarily determines whether a jurisdiction is willfully
refusing to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, and therefore is a sanctuary.
This could also mean that the Secretary or Attorney General may base his
or her determination on an analysis of a jurisdiction’s showing of
compliance with the 8 U.S.C. § 1373. And finally, it is unclear how a
violation of the statute would be defined and what consideration would
be given to a remedial process like that set out in the 2016 OJP
guidelines.123
VI. REVISING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13768
To slightly repackage Justice Breyer’s statement in Zadvydas, while
the President may have the power to do what he wishes, he must choose
118. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (stating
“jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not
eligible to receive Federal grants” but failing to specify which Federal grants).
119. Ruud, supra note 41.
120. Cameron, supra note 32.
121. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (stating that if Congress desires to condition states on federal
grants through its spending power, it must allow “States to exercise their choice knowingly.”).
122. Id. at 207.
123. See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 85 (“[T]he recipient must take sufficient and
effective steps to bring it into compliance and submit documentation that details the steps taken,
contains a validation that the recipient has come into compliance, and includes an official legal
opinion from counsel (including related legal analysis) adequately supporting the validation.”).
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“a constitutionally permissive means of implementing that power.”124
E.O. 13768 is not a permissive implementation or use of that power. To
cure E.O. 13768, the Administration must attend to the due process issue
by not leaving the designation of a municipality as a sanctuary
jurisdiction that results in the deprivation of federal grants up to an
individual’s discretion.125 The Administration must also clarify which
federal funds, and in what quantity may be withheld for non-compliance
to ensure a state is encouraged to comply without feeling there is a gun
to its head.126
A. Defining “Sanctuary Jurisdiction” as a City that Fails Formal DOJ
OIG Review Process
The Administration should establish a more reliable way of
determining which jurisdictions are sanctuaries, and thus potentially
eligible for federal defunding. To do this, the Administration should make
clear that the designation of “sanctuary jurisdiction” is not one that an
individual, such as the Secretary, makes, but a conclusion of a formal
review process conducted by the OIG of DOJ. Similar to the OJP 2016
guidelines, if OIG receives credible evidence that a jurisdiction is not
complying with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, then that jurisdiction should be afforded
the opportunity to conduct a review and complete documentation proving
they are compliant with 8 U.S.C. § 1373; or, in the alternative, the
jurisdiction should be given a “cure” period during which they will
update OIG with the steps taken to achieve compliance.127 If a
jurisdiction is still not in compliance, then, at a minimum, a pretermination hearing should be held giving the jurisdiction a chance to
request additional time to comply or alternatively make an affirmative
showing they are in compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. This process
should be informed by the well-established principles of substantive and
procedural due process as illustrated in precedent administrative law

124. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
941–942 (1983)).
125. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
126. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012).
127. See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 85 (establishing a process under which
recipients of JAG and SCAAP funds can remedy noncompliance of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 only after the
OJP has received credible evidence that the recipient is in violation of this section and the recipient
has undergone a review).
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authorities128 and allow petitioning grantees to rely on other decisions
decided by the OIG to help build a sense of stability and precedent.
B. Narrow Federal Defunding of Sanctuary Jurisdictions to
Law Enforcement Programming
The Administration should be guided by the principles established in
Dole where the Supreme Court found that it was not coercive to withhold
5% of federal funds for highway transportation work because it was
related to the purpose of the Act and would not have an intolerable effect
on state budgets.129 The Administration could limit the scope of the
federal funds to be withheld to fields that relate to the Order and
underlying statute: immigration and law enforcement grants.130 The
Administration could also tailor the amount of federal funds to be
withheld, focusing on the SCAAP and JAG grants referenced in OJP’s
2016 8 U.S.C. § 1373 compliance guidelines, instead of targeting all
federal grants.131 If the Administration does not address the due process
issues and the ambiguous meaning of “sanctuary jurisdiction,” the Order
could still fail the second rule of Dole.132
VII. CONCLUSION
It is not enough to ask “what?” One must ask “how?” The Trump
Administration’s Executive Order 13768 is unconstitutional. The
Administration’s goal of incentivizing municipalities to assist, or at least
not hinder federal immigration enforcement’s efforts, is perfectly legal.
While the federal government’s immigration power is great, it is limited
by the bounds of Due Process, the Tenth Amendment, and the Spending
128. See e.g. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1970) (“[W]hen welfare is
discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due
process.”) Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (discussing the administrative hearing
process that resulted in the termination of Social Security Disability benefits).
129. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987) (finding that withholding a
small percentage of the states’ funds was only a “mild encouragement for the States to enact higher
minimum drinking ages . . . .”).
130. Id. at 207–09 (relating the purpose behind granting of highway funds (“safe interstate
travel”) as the purpose underpinning the condition imposed by the congressional act requiring the
minimum drinking age be twenty-one for all states receiving highway fund grants (“condition[ing]
the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address this particular impediment to
a purpose for which the funds are expended.”)).
131. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 85.
132. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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Clause. E.O. 13768 is an aggressive power-grab by the Executive Branch
of the federal government, communicating to state and local governments
the singular message: “comply or face the consequences.” While the
President may have the power to do what he wishes, he must choose “a
constitutionally permissive means of implementing that power.”133 E.O.
13768 fails this test and should be struck down as a violation of Due
Process, the Tenth Amendment, and the Spending Clause.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 20, 2017, Judge William Orrick granted the City of San
Francisco and the County of Santa Clara’s motion for summary
judgment, imposing a permanent injunction on enforcement of E.O.
13768. Judge Orrick concluded the Order violated the principle of
separation of powers established in the Constitution; the unambiguous
requirement, the nexus requirement, and the legitimate choice
requirement of the Spending Clause; and the Tenth Amendment by
compelling states to enforce regulatory programs through coercion.134
Further, Judge Orrick found the order was unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the order
violated the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process requirements.135
Numerous other jurisdictions issued similar nationwide, permanent
injunctions against the executive order on various grounds.136 In
December of 2017, the Trump Administration filed an appeal to the 9th
Circuit, challenging the permanent injunction issued in the Northern
District of California.137 Oral arguments were held on April 11, 2018 in
San Francisco.

133. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
941–942 (1983)).
134. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1214–16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,
2017).
135. Id.
136. See e.g. City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173376
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15,
2017); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2017 WL 5489476 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2017).
137. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-17480 (9th Cir. Filed Dec. 14, 2017).
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